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Abstract 
The city of Cape Town suffered a severe water crisis in 2018. At the peak of the drought in 
South Africa’s Western Cape, a randomised control trial at 105 schools investigated the impact 
of two behavioural interventions to encourage responsible water usage: detailed water usage 
data feedback from smart meters, and an interschool competition. Interventions reduced water 
usage in these schools by 15 to 26%. The information feedback was found to be more effective 
in reducing night time water use, indicating better water usage by the staff, while the 
competition was found to be more effective during the day time, indicating better water usage 
by the pupils. The contrast highlights the way feedback was understood differently by the two 
groups, with different effects on their assumption of responsibility. This example from Cape 
Town demonstrates the effectiveness of combining smart technologies with nudges. It provides 
a model of water conservation interventions for sustainable cities. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Cape Town made world headlines in 2018 as a major city on the brink of seeing its taps run 
dry. Its predicament drew attention to the challenge that water scarcity presents for cities in the 
21st century. Globally, over four billion people face severe freshwater shortages and this 
number is expected to rise (Mekonnen and Hoekstra, 2016). The Water Resources Group 
(2017) predicts that by 2030 there will be a 40% gap between freshwater supply and demand 
if business-as-usual water management continues. . Clearly this challenge requires supply-side 
solutions, but water demand management is increasingly being recognised as an important aid 
to ensuring a sustainable water supply (Arbués et al., 2003; Russell and Fielding, 2010).  
 
Traditionally, water demand management has relied on the use of direct incentive-augmenting 
schemes and pecuniary policy such as high tariffs. However, there is increasing evidence of 
the effectiveness of behavioural insights and nudges in changing water usage behaviour 
(Sønderlund et al., 2014). Nudges can be an attractive alternative for policymakers because 
they are cost-effective and easy to implement. Our study investigated how nudges can be 
applied in schools. 
 
Schools offer an ideal platform for promoting conservation behaviour because they are big 
water users and because the interventions will have a ripple effect in the community (Booysen 
et al., 2019a). We conducted a randomised control trial at a sample of 105 schools in the 
Western Cape, South Africa, in which we tested two behavioural treatments: information 
feedback and a social comparison in the form of an interschool competition. We used data from 
smart water meters to track usage patterns accurately and give the schools detailed usage 
feedback. Thirty of the schools constituted the control group, receiving smart meter installation 
but no usage feedback. 
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2. The Cape Town water crisis 
 
Between 2015 and 2018 the Western Cape Province of South Africa endured an extremely 
severe drought (Maxmen, 2018). Dam levels fell to below 22% of capacity in March 2018, 
bringing Cape Town close to becoming the world’s first major city to run out of water. Apart 
from the drought, factors that compounded the water crisis were rapid population growth, 
heavy dependence on rainfall and poor investment in water supply infrastructure (Muller, 
2018). Contingency plans were made for a purported “Day Zero”, when the city council would 
have to turn off the municipal water supply (Enqvist and Ziervogel, 2019). 
 
In response to the water crisis, the City of Cape Town adopted a number of demand-side-
management interventions to curb residential water usage. These included water restrictions, 
media campaigns, dramatic tariff escalations and green nudges (Parks et al., 2019; Visser and 
Brühl, 2018). At the height of the crisis, the City of Cape Town introduced Level 6B water 
restrictions that limited residents to 50 litres per person per day.  
 
Water prices had increased by 337% since the start of the drought (Brühl and Visser, 2019). 
The combination of these interventions led to an unprecedented overall water usage reduction 
of close to 50% in less than three years (Brühl and Visser, 2019). In the process, Cape Town 
avoided the “Day Zero” that had been predicted for the summer of 2018. This achievement 
highlights the importance of demand-side management for city water. Our study accentuates 
the role that behavioural interventions can play in bolstering water demand management and 
promoting conservation behaviour in cities. 
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3. Behavioural insights and water conservation behaviour 
 
Traditional economic theory, springing from the works of Adam Smith (1776) and John Stuart 
Mill (1836), works on the premise that people are utility-maximising perfectly rational agents. 
Behavioural economics now casts doubt on the notion of homo economicus and recognises the 
effects of biases and heuristics on decision making (Kahneman, 2003; Thaler and Sunstein, 
2008). Greater understanding of cognitive biases has produced nudge theory and choice 
architecture, which offer ideas on how to improve human decision-making. Nudges have been 
applied and tested in many contexts, including energy (Vine et al., 2013), healthcare (Koshy et 
al., 2008; Martin et al., 2012), finance (Karlan et al., 2010; Thaler and Benartzi, 2004) and 
education (Bradbury et al., 2013). Growing evidence of how nudges can bring about 
behavioural change is now inspiring researchers to experiment with this approach in the field 
of water conservation. 
 
One of the reasons for residential water wastage is that users are ill-informed. This can be 
difficult to remedy. Information failure is of many kinds: asymmetrical, inaccurate, incomplete, 
uncertain or misunderstood. Some domestic water usage, such as toilet flushing, is invisible to 
the user, and where it is visible it is hard to quantify. And because water billing information is 
aggregated over long periods, consumers are generally unaware of the amount of water they 
use for their household activities. Complex, obscure, infrequent and delayed information makes 
it hard for users to link their behaviour to usage (Kahneman, 2003; Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). 
Information failure is particularly prevalent in South Africa because municipalities rely on 
manual reading of water meters. The time lag between using the water and getting the bill 
means that users experience a disconnect between water use and cost. This limits their ability 
to respond to water pricing and make optimal resource use decisions (Datta et al., 2015; 
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Gaudin, 2006). They may understand the importance of resource conservation, but fail to link 
it to their own behaviour (Darby, 2006). Recognising the problem of information failure, the 
conservation behaviour literature has identified improved usage feedback as an important tool 
in managing resource demand (Nielsen et al., 2017). However, more research has been done 
on this topic in the field of energy conservation than in water conservation (Sønderlund et al., 
2014). 
 
3.1. Energy usage behaviour 
 
There is substantial evidence of the effectiveness of behavioural interventions in curbing 
energy usage, with resulting reductions in energy use of between 5% and 20% (Gans et al., 
2013; Houde et al., 2013; Vine et al., 2013). Insights from energy usage research are 
particularly translatable to water usage because the management of both resources is prone to 
information failure, non-obvious pricing and the impossibility of observing usage directly. The 
literature review by Vine et al. (2013) identifies features of user feedback that have been found 
effective in inducing energy saving: it must be clear and meaningful and related to a standard, 
and there must be minimal delay between energy use and feedback. An earlier review by 
Fischer (2008) identifies other features that have made feedback effective: frequent reports 
over a long period, an appliance-specific breakdown and computerised interactive tools.  
 
Social norm messaging and comparison have also been found effective in reducing energy 
usage (Allcott, 2011; Klege et al., 2018). In an inter-floor randomised control trial in a large 
provincial government office building, Klege et al. (2018) found that social comparison nudges 
reduced energy usage by between 9% and 14% over five months. However, there is some 
debate about the effectiveness of social comparison. Some studies have found that it can cause 
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a “boomerang” effect in which water usage increases (Fischer, 2008; Schultz et al., 2007). 
Individuals whose usage is lower than that of their competitors may feel entitled to increase 
their usage. To avoid this adverse effect, social comparison can be combined with injunctive 
norms (Frederiks et al., 2015). 
 
3.2. Water usage behaviour 
 
Findings have been similar in the water demand management literature, where usage feedback 
is usually either mail-based (Aitken et al., 1994; Brick et al., 2018; Datta et al., 2015; Ferraro 
et al., 2011; Ferraro and Price, 2013; Geller et al., 1983; Kurz et al., 2005), or provided by 
smart water meters (Booysen et al., 2019b; Erickson et al., 2012; Fielding et al., 2013; Liu et 
al., 2016; Petersen et al., 2007). Mail-based usage feedback is often provided through the 
existing utility bill infrastructure, thus minimising intervention costs (Sønderlund et al., 2014). 
Brick et al. (2018) used mail-based feedback to test eight behavioural nudges on a sample of 
400,000 households over six months at the onset of the Cape Town water crisis. The nudges 
reduced water use by between 0.6% and 1.3% across the various treatments when compared to 
a control group. Publicly recognising water conservation (social recognition) or appealing to 
households to act in the public interest (appeal to the public good) were found to be the most 
effective motivators for water saving.  
 
Ferraro and Price (2013) also highlight the importance of social incentives. They find that 
appeals to prosocial norms and the use of social comparison were effective in reducing water 
use in Georgia, USA. Interestingly, they found that the effect on households that received a 
prosocial norm appeal dissipated within a year, but the effect on the social comparison group 
was still detectable five years after intervention (Bernedo et al., 2014; Ferraro et al., 2011). 
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Similarly, Datta et al. (2015) found that a neighbourhood-wide social comparison in Belén, 
Costa Rica, reduced water use by between 3.7% and 5.6% over two months. However, a social 
comparison at municipal level did not influence behaviour. In contrast, Kurz et al. (2005) found 
that social comparison feedback did not significantly reduce water use in Perth, Australia, but 
that environmental impact awareness labels at water usage points were effective. 
 
Smart water meters have the advantage over municipal meters in providing more frequent and 
more detailed usage information, thus allowing both the researcher and the user to monitor 
usage habits more closely and detect leaks earlier (Sønderlund et al., 2014). The more detailed 
information that smart water meters provide can also be used to design behavioural 
interventions.  
 
Fielding et al. (2013) used smart water meters to test the effect of three once-off treatments 
(social comparison, feedback and water-saving education) on residential water use in 
Queensland, Australia. On average, households in the experimental groups used 7.9% less 
water than those in the control group. However, there were no significant differences across 
the different treatments, and all treatment effects dissipated within a year. In contrast to the 
once-off treatment approach, Erickson et al. (2012) applied usage feedback over nine weeks 
using smart water meters in Dubuque, USA. Water use feedback, along with a social 
comparison, was provided to residential users every three hours through an online portal. The 
experimental group used 6.6% less water than the control group. Although these two studies 
found evidence that usage feedback can improve water usage behaviour, the shortage of 
research on this topic makes it difficult to draw strong conclusions, particularly as most of the 
research has been on residential usage. 
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One exception is a study by Petersen et al. (2007) of the effect of water and electricity usage 
feedback in twenty-two university residences. The study used smart meters, provided feedback 
through an online portal, and conducted an inter-residence usage reduction competition. On 
average across the residences there was a 3% reduction in water use and a much larger 32% 
reduction in electricity use. However, it should be noted that as the study was primarily framed 
in terms of energy conservation, the students were probably more focused on electricity saving. 
An important difference in this study is that, unlike household users, these users (students) 
were not directly responsible for the utility bills. This was also the case in our schools study, 
where school staff and pupils were not directly responsible for the water bills. This is an 
important distinction from studies that evaluate water use in households, where the user is 
directly responsible for the bill. 
 
Apart from Petersen et al. (2007), there is a real scarcity of research on the effect that a 
combination of smart technologies and behavioural insights and nudges can have on 
conservation behaviour beyond the household context. A study by Samuels and Booysen 
(2019) on a small sample of five schools, found that presenting electricity usage feedback to 
staff in a visual and intuitive format decreased electricity usage by between 11% and 14%. 
Conducting research in large public settings, such as schools, is challenging because of the 
financial outlay, diversity of stakeholders and complexity of technology that is required for 
rigorous evaluation. Our study thus makes a vital contribution to the literature by using smart 
water meters to evaluate behavioural interventions in a substantial sample of 105 schools. 
Furthermore, the majority of such studies have been done in developed countries (Datta and 
Mullainathan, 2014). Our study was in a developing country setting, where it is vital to ensure 
that contextual nuances are accounted for in policymaking. 
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4. Study methods 
 
This study used ideas from the reviewed literature to design an experimental behavioural 
intervention to reduce water usage in a sample of 105 schools. This sample included both 
primary and secondary government schools. We sent usage reports as feedback to the users, 
taking presentation, timing and personalisation into careful consideration, and ran a social 
comparison in the form of an inter-school competition. Scalability of the intervention was also 
an important consideration. The duration of the study was eight months. 
 
4.1. Experimental design 
 
A randomised control trial was used to evaluate the effect of a behavioural intervention that 
took two forms: usage feedback and an inter-school competition. After smart water meters had 
been installed, all the schools received a once-off leak detection and maintenance upgrade. 
Thereafter, they underwent a nine-week baseline period before treatments were applied. The 
maintenance upgrades that were done after meter installation and before baseline readings were 
taken helped to minimise the schools’ infrastructural differences prior to treatment. The 105 
schools were divided into three groups: a control group of 30 schools that received smart meter 
installation but no feedback on their usage; a treatment group of 33 schools (labelled ‘T1 – 
feedback’) that received feedback about their daily and weekly water usage; and a treatment 
group of 42 schools (labelled ‘T2 – social comparison’) that received feedback about their daily 
and weekly water usage and also comparative feedback on their water usage relative to other 
schools.  
Groups T1 and T2 received weekly usage reports via email and text message to the principal 
and two additional staff members. Both T1 and T2 received feedback information about their 
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water usage. The schools also received a pre-designed poster that could be updated weekly 
with the latest water usage information. The poster was displayed next to the school’s notice 
board with the intention of improving information transfer from staff to pupils. In addition, T2 
also received a social comparison treatment consisting of a leader board showing the 
percentage of water saved (relative to the pre-intervention baseline) by other T2 schools. To 
bring this information to the attention of pupils, principals were asked to share this information 
with the pupils during weekly assemblies. This encouraged competition.  
Schools were randomly allocated to the three groups on the basis of usage in the pre-
intervention baseline period and stratified on usage terciles to ensure that schools across the 
usage distribution were equally distributed among the treatment and control groups. Feedback 
reports were sent to the schools every Monday. Many of the schools did not have reliable 
internet access, thus treatment had to be applied through text message and email rather than 
through an online portal in order to ensure equality of treatment across schools. Examples of 
the information and posters can be seen in the Appendix. 
Table I: Waves and schools per treatment 
Wave Start of baseline Start of treatment Control Treatment 1 Treatment 2 
1 12 February 2018 15 April 2018 9 10 14 
2 16 April 2018 3 June 2018 15 16 19 
3 21 May 2018 22 July 2018 6 7 9 
   30 33 42 
Control: Schools not provided with water usage feedback. 
Treatment 1: Schools provided with water usage feedback. 
Treatment 2: Schools provided with water usage feedback and a comparison with other schools. 
 
 
The schools entered the study in three waves as shown in Table I. This stepped approach to 
treatment implementation (Kremer, 2003) was necessary firstly because the severity of the 
drought made water saving a top priority and the City of Cape Town and corporate funders of 
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the intervention wanted feedback reports as soon as possible, and secondly because installing 
the smart water meters and doing the maintenance work was a lengthy process. 
4.2. Dataset  
 
The dataset was provided by BridgIoT, the company that managed the installation of smart 
water meters and data collection as part of a water savings campaign.† The dataset contains 
water flow rates at 30-minute intervals for the 105 schools over a period ranging from February 
2018 to October 2018.  
Table II: Descriptive statistics 
    Water volume litres/30 minutes 
Group Period Mean Median SD N 
All hours (00:00-24:00) 
C
o
n
t.
 
Pre 95 30 169 62 814 
Post 106 35 161 132 513 
T
1
 Pre 114 30 181 69 516 
Post 109 40 156 152 197 
T
2
 Pre 109 40 176 90 682 
Post 114 50 165 171 927 
Night hours (00:00-04:00) 
C
o
n
t.
 
Pre 47 10 126 9 163 
Post 54 10 106 19 327 
T
1
 Pre 60 0 144 10 136 
Post 47 0 93 22 197 
T
2
 Pre 53 0 107 13 230 
Post 57 0 108 25 067 
School hours (07:00-14:00) 
C
o
n
t.
 
Pre 225 160 224 11 604 
Post 255 200 223 24 838 
T
1
 Pre 271 213 219 12 075 
Post 273 240 194 27 916 
T
2
 Pre 267 190 253 15,998 
Post 273 210 230 32 533 
Cont.: Control Group. T1: Treatment 1. T2: Treatment 2 
 
Table II shows basic summary statistics of the water usage data across different times of the 
day. Overall, taking into account all hours and days and not just school hours and days, the 
 
† http://www.schoolswater.co.za/ 
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mean water usage in the pre-intervention period was 107 litres/30min across all three groups. 
For school day hours (07:00–14:00) and night hours (01:00–04:00) the pre-intervention water 
usage means were 256 litres/30min and 53 litres/30min respectively. 
4.3. Pre-intervention analysis 
 
The difference-in-differences model used in this study relies on the common trend assumption, 
i.e. that in the absence of treatment water usage trends are the same in the control and treatment 
groups, implying that a deviation from the common trend after the treatment is a result of the 
treatment (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). To investigate whether the assumption held, we did pre-
intervention balance tests and a time trend analysis. 
Table III: Pre-intervention balance tests 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Volume Volume Volume Pupils Fees 
            
Treatment 1 8.935 8.864 16.84 46.19 -0.125 
 (21.56) (20.18) (32.29) (88.86) (0.128) 
Treatment 2 8.168 5.676 24.22 60.03 -0.106 
 (17.51) (16.91) (30.40) (74.24) (0.121) 
      
Hours All Night School All All 
 00:00-24:00 00:00-04:00 07:00-14:00 00:00-24:00 00:00-24:00 
Days All All School All All 
Observations 223,012 32,529 39,677 223,012 223,012 
No. of schools 105 105 105 105 105 
Pre-intervention period. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the school level. Suppressed coefficients on 
usage tercile (randomisation stratified on usage tercile). School days excludes weekends and holidays.  
Water volume in litres/30min 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table III presents the pre-intervention balance tests. These tests are performed by regressing 
the dummy variables indicating treatment group on water usage. To control for stratification, 
usage tercile dummy variables are also included as explanatory variables (Bruhn and 
McKenzie, 2009). The table shows that water usage was balanced across treatment groups 
with none of the coefficients in columns (1), (2) and (3) being significant. Columns (4) and (5) 
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show that the schools are also balanced as regards pupil numbers and fees (fees being a variable 
that indicates whether a school is fee-paying or not). As the treatment groups are well balanced, 
we expect extraneous factors such as increased awareness about the need to save water because 
of the drought to be consistent across the control and treatment groups. 
To investigate whether the control and treatment groups have different water usage time trends, 
a constant linear time trend model was also estimated. Table IV includes models for both the 
treatments and across two different time specifications: all hours (columns 1 and 2) and school 
day hours (columns 3 and 4). Any differences in the time trends of water use are captured in 
the interaction of the treatment indicators and the weekly pre-treatment trend. Across all 
specifications, the coefficient on the interaction term does not differ significantly from zero. 
As a result, we conclude that there are no significant differences in the time trends between the 
control and treatment groups. The balance tests and time trend analysis indicate that the control 
group provides a valid counterfactual for both treatments.   
Table IV: Pre-intervention time trend analysis 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables T1 T2 T1 T2 
          
Pre-trend -0.00962** -0.00962** -0.00611 -0.00629 
 (0.004) (0.00411) (0.00480) (0.00480) 
Treatment 75.43 44.13 22.53 41.93 
 (54.47) (39.27) (64.46) (46.92) 
Treatment X Pre-trend -0.0128 -0.00720 -0.000779 -0.00400 
 (0.00947) (0.00676) (0.0113) (0.00797) 
     
Hours All hours All hours School hours School hours 
 00:00-24:00 00:00-24:00 07:00-14:00 07:00-14:00 
Days All All School School 
Observations 132,330 153,496 23,679 27,602 
No. of schools 63 72 63 72 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the school level. Pre-intervention period. Suppressed coefficients on 
usage tercile (randomisation stratified on usage tercile).  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
T1: Treatment group 1 
T2: Treatment group 2 
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5. Econometric models 
 
To estimate the effect of the behavioural interventions we used the difference-in-differences 
(DiD) model. 
 
5.2. Difference-in-differences (DiD) model 
 
(
1
) 
𝑣𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡
𝑇1 +  𝛽2𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡
𝑇2 +  𝛽3𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛿1(𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡
𝑇1 × 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡) + 𝛿2(𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡
𝑇2 × 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡)
+ 𝜆𝑋𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(1) 
 
where 𝑣𝑖𝑡 is the volume of water used per 30 minutes by school 𝑖 at time 𝑡 in litres/30min, 
𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑋 are dummy variables for each treatment group, and 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 is a dummy variable 
coded as 0 for all pre-treatment observations and 1 for all post-treatment observations. 
Interaction variables between treatment dummies and the  𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 variable also form part of the 
model. 𝑋 represents other control variables: number of pupils, water consumption tercile, 
dummy variables for holidays, weekends and an indicator for after hours (14:00 – 07:00). In 
addition, 𝑋 also contains an indicator for major leaks that took place in the post period and for 
periods when high night-time water flow occurred. Night flow indicates a minor leak such as 
a faulty toilet or dripping tap. Days with night flow were those where average consumption 
between 01:00 and 04:00 exceeded 10 litres/30min. Major leaks were either recorded by 
schools or were periods when consumption exceeded ten times the school’s average water 
usage over the entire study. Monthly indicator variables are also included to account for 
seasonality.  
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The difference-in-differences estimators for the information and competition treatments are 
provided by the coefficients on the interaction dummies 𝛿1 and 𝛿2, respectively. This is because 
the 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 variable coefficient captures breaks from the general trend in water usage in the post 
period, while the treatment variables capture mean differences in the water usage of treatment 
schools relative to control schools in the estimation sample (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). Thus 
𝛿1 and 𝛿2 are measures of the difference in the water usage of treatment schools in the post-
treatment periods relative to what we would expect to observe based on all the covariates and 
the pre-existing trend. Therefore, the average impact of the information feedback and 
interschool competition is estimated as follows: 
 
(1) 𝐷𝐷1 = 𝐸[𝑣𝑖1
𝑇1 − 𝑣𝑖0
𝑇1] − 𝐸[𝑣𝑖1
𝐶 − 𝑣𝑖0
𝐶] (2) 
(1) 𝐷𝐷2 = 𝐸[𝑣𝑖1
𝑇2 − 𝑣𝑖0
𝑇2] − 𝐸[𝑣𝑖1
𝐶 − 𝑣𝑖0
𝐶] (3) 
 
To account for any unobserved heterogeneity, the standard panel ordinary least squares fixed 
effect estimator with robust standard errors is used. These standard errors are clustered at the 
school level. 
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6. Results 
 
Figure 1: Median change in water usage from baseline median by treatment group 
 
Figure 1 plots the median change in water usage from the baseline median over the sampling 
period for the different treatment groups. The decline in usage in July for all three groups 
coincides with the school holidays over this period. During the holidays, the control group’s 
usage decreased by less than both T1 and T2. As schools close over this period, we would 
expect water usage to drop to very low levels. Follow-up surveys with staff in the treatment 
groups found that schools turned off their main water supply valves during holidays in order 
to save water. The subsequent increase in usage across all groups during July coincides with 
the end of the holidays and the arrival of the rainy season in the Western Cape. During August 
and September, Figure 1 indicates another distinct difference in water usage change across the 
groups with the control group increasing more than the treatment groups.  
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6.1. Difference-in-differences results 
 
Table V presents the difference-in-differences regression results with four different time 
specifications across the three waves.  
 
Table V: Difference-in-difference regressions 
 
The full model in column (1) shows that information feedback treatment (T1) decreased water 
usage by 27.29 litres/30min on average, while the information feedback plus social comparison 
treatment (T2) decreased water use by 16.13 litres/30min on average. This equates to 
reductions of 25.60% and 15.13% respectively. Both these results are statistically significant 
Dependent variable: Water usage volume litres/30min 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All Night School After 
     
Post 19.59** 19.98** 25.34** 22.14**  
(8.45) (8.40) (10.08) (8.83) 
Treatment1 X Post -27.29** -31.23** -26.96* -31.53**  
(13.02) (12.93) (13.84) (13.58) 
Treatment2 X Post -16.13** -11.73 -28.48*** -16.13** 
 (7.52) (8.34) (9.29) (8.06) 
     
Major leak  938.60*** 1 530*** 695.40*** 1 297*** 
 (54.53) (160.40) (33.35) (76.69) 
Night flow 61.62*** 101.50*** 40.66*** 65.40*** 
 (6.61) (8.91) (7.84) (6.65) 
     
Constant 208.30*** 36.85*** 318.10*** 80.70*** 
 (12.69) (11.72) (15.11) (10.76) 
     
Hours All hours Night hours School hours After hours 
 00:00-24:00 01:00-04:00 07:00-14:00 14:00-07:00 
Weekends & holidays Yes Yes No No 
Observations 679 649 99 120 124 964 274 935 
R-squared 0.38 0.40 0.27 0.270 
No. of schools 105 105 105 105 
Baseline mean vol. 106.60 53.48 255.70 70.97 
Percentage reduction: 
Treatment 1 -25.60% -58.40% -10.54% -44.43% 
Treatment 2 -15.13% -21.93% -11.14% -22.73% 
Fixed effects regressions. Robust standard errors clustered on school in parentheses. Suppressed coefficients on month, 
week, afterhours, weekends, public holidays and school holidays.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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and robust to standardisation of the dependent variable to usage per pupil. Table A1 in the 
Appendix shows that when standardised to per pupil, coefficients are negative and significant 
across all specifications.  
 
The division of the DiD analysis across time of day is important as water is used for different 
purposes during the day. During school hours most of the usage is by pupils. Column (3) 
therefore mostly represents pupil responses to the behavioural treatment. Night time usage 
mostly indicates the presence of leaks and water management practices. Water management 
practices refers to how staff maintain water infrastructure, do leak detection and manage water 
flow. Although reductions in night time flow could be due to changes in the behaviour of pupils 
(for example, being more careful not to leave taps running), they are more likely to be due to 
reductions in leaks as a result of staff members improving water management. Column (2) 
therefore mostly represents changes in the behaviour of staff members responsible for water 
management. 
 
Column (3) shows that the T1 group reduced its water use by 26.96 litres/30min on average, 
and the T2 group by 28.48 litres/30min on average, suggesting that T2 was marginally more 
effective in changing pupils’ water usage behaviour than T1. The T2 result is also substantially 
more significant than the T1 result, indicating greater precision in the social comparison 
treatment effect during school hours. Column (3) indicates that pupils are more motivated to 
save water within the comparative setting. 
 
In contrast to the school hour results, the night time and after hours models (columns 2 and 4) 
show larger reductions for T1 than for T2. Column (2) shows that T1 reduced its water use by 
31.23 litres/30min and T2 by 11.73 litres/30min on average during night hours. It may seem 
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counterintuitive that feedback alone achieved bigger reductions than feedback plus 
competition, suggesting that the competition had a negative effect. However, as night time flow 
is largely an indicator of staff behaviour, we suggest three possible explanations that have been 
proposed in the literature. One is information overload: too much complex information may 
have hindered rather than helped the staff to manage water usage and fix leaks (Roetzel, 2018). 
Another is the “boomerang” effect: staff at schools with usage above the mean responded 
negatively to their school being compared with other schools and reduced their water saving 
efforts (Clee and Wicklund, 1980; Schultz et al., 2007). And another is the “social loafing” 
effect: the staff may have shifted the burden of responsibility to the pupils, seeing them as the 
primary target of the competition, and reduced their own water-saving efforts in consequence 
(Karau and Williams, 1993; Latane et al., 1979; Ringelmann, 1913).  
 
A pilot study and follow-up surveys indicated that information overload in the weekly reports 
was not a problem for staff. The weekly reports were clear, simply formatted and easily 
understandable (examples are provided in the Appendix: Figure A1 – A4). Table A2 in the 
Appendix shows that there was no boomerang effect, as schools above and below the baseline 
mean reduced water usage after treatment. Qualitative feedback from staff also showed that 
although there was some negative sentiment towards inclusion in the social comparison, most 
staff responded positively to being able to compare their usage to other schools. Thus, the third 
explanation above is the most likely reason why T1 did better than T2 on after-hour usage, i.e. 
social loafing (individuals making less effort because they are in a group) and staff abdicating 
responsibility because they thought the competitive effort was the responsibility of the pupils 
and the school at large, i.e. not taking personal ownership of water saving. 
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Evidence for this explanation can be seen in Table V. Considering that reductions in night flow 
(00:00–04:00) reflect improvements in water management behaviour by staff and that school 
time (07:00–14:00) water use largely reflects pupil behaviour, the fact that T2 is more effective 
during school hours while T1 is more effective during night hours points to staff making less 
effort to save water when a social comparison is applied. More simply, the results in Table V 
imply that when comparative information is provided, night time water saving due to staff 
behaviour declines and school hours water saving by pupils increases. Staff in T1, who received 
only feedback, took responsibility for water saving and improved their behaviour accordingly, 
for example by making regular searches for leaks and switching off the water mains over night 
and on weekends.  
 
The sensitivity of the results to schools that had high water usage as a result of leaks is 
evaluated in Table A3 in the Appendix. In this table the schools with a median water usage 
greater than 200 litres/30min are dropped in columns (2), (5) and (11) and schools with median 
water usage greater than 150 litres/30min are dropped in columns (3), (6) and (12). As more 
high users are excluded, the treatment effect of T2 increases and remains significant. In 
contrast, the treatment effect of T1 decreases and becomes less significant. This indicates that 
the estimates for T2 are more robust and accurate than those for T1. This is an important result 
as it provides further support for the different effects of the two treatments on staff and pupils. 
The greater variation that we find in T1 points to staff behaviour. Individual staff members can 
have a dramatic effect on a school’s water usage by improving water management decisions. 
An individual pupil cannot do this, hence the lesser variation in T2 and the more accurate 
estimates.  
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The results indicate that significant amounts of water were saved. Over the course of the study 
more than 8.5 megalitres of water were saved at the treatment schools as a result of the 
behavioural interventions. Should this level of saving be maintained, it would amount to an 
average saving of over 380 kilolitres per school per year. This saving equates to an annual  
saving of R36 453 (US$2 430) per school based on drought tariffs of R97.17/kilolitre 
(Department of Water and Sanitation, 2018). The cost of meter installation, maintenance at the 
schools and administration of behavioural treatments for a year cost a total of R30 000 
(US$2 000) per school. This indicates that the behavioural nudges were cost effective as 
schools recuperated these costs within ten months. However, this does not include the savings 
made as a result of the maintenance upgrades that were implemented prior to the behavioural 
study. Accounting for the additional savings from maintenance, although less robust, further 
increases the return on investment.‡ 
 
6.2. Treatment effect over time 
 
Past studies have found that treatment effects dissipate over time (Ferraro and Price, 2013; 
Fielding et al., 2013; Klege et al., 2018). Table VI shows the effect of our interventions over 
four months after treatment through DiD regression specifications that define the ‘post’ period 
as cumulative months after intervention. Specifications (1) to (5) include all hours and days 
and (6) to (10) restrict the sample to school day hours. 
 
The table shows that the treatment effects intensified over the four months. Columns (1) to (5), 
covering all hours, show that the effect of T1 increases from a reduction of 16.88 litres/30min 
 
‡ Booysen et al. 2019a estimate a saving of R9 694 (US$646) per school per month as a result of the 
maintenance upgrades made prior to the behavioural interventions. 
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after one month of treatment to a reduction of 27.29 litres/30min after four months of treatment, 
and that the effect of T2 increases correspondingly, from 10.94 litres/30min to 16.13 
litres/30min. The same trend can be seen in columns (6) to (10), limited to school hours only. 
The longer the treatment period, the more the water saving decisions improved. Staff took time 
to internalise the information they received and learn how to use it to manage water use better 
and encourage pupils to save water. A longer-term study would reveal whether the treatment 
effects would intensify or dissipate.
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Table VI: Cumulative month-by-month difference-in-difference regressions 
Dependent variable: Water usage volume litres/30min 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 1 Month 2 Month 3 Month 4 Month All 1 Month 2 Month 3 Month 4 Month All 
                      
Post 17.43* 5.03 16.80** 15.54* 19.59** 24.86* 9.96 19.01* 21.29** 25.34** 
 (9.50) (8.32) (8.41) (8.68) (8.45) (13.04) (11.00) (10.48) (10.56) (10.08) 
Treatment 1 X Post -16.88* -16.49* -22.20* -26.60** -27.29** -12.36 -15.60 -22.58* -26.33* -26.96* 
 (9.47) (9.46) (11.64) (12.84) (13.02) (13.87) (11.23) (11.99) (13.62) (13.84) 
Treatment2 X Post -10.94 -8.43 -10.19 -14.98* -16.13** -16.43 -15.56* -19.74** -26.27*** -28.48*** 
 (8.53) (7.43) (7.90) (7.85) (7.52) (11.59) (9.07) (8.84) (9.29) (9.29) 
            
Major leak 1 008.0*** 971.2*** 970.9*** 947.7*** 938.6*** 711.8*** 697.1*** 706.4*** 697.8*** 695.4*** 
 (74.97) (67.23) (63.00) (58.20) (54.53) (40.38) (37.58) (38.04) (35.83) (33.35) 
            
Constant 212.0*** 187.3*** 201.8*** 199.9*** 208.3*** 354.6*** 306.8*** 315.1*** 311.9*** 318.1*** 
 (17.11) (14.02) (14.72) (13.88) (12.69) (20.61) (16.64) (17.44) (17.23) (15.11) 
            
Hours All All All All All School School School School School 
 00:00-24:00 00:00-24:00 00:00-24:00 00:00-24:00 00:00-24:00 07:00-14:00 07:00-14:00 07:00-14:00 07:00-14:00 07:00-14:00 
Weekends & holidays Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No 
Observations 347 776 464 463 558 256 629 357 679 649 62 527 85 041 97 521 113 414 124 964 
R-squared 0.40 0.39 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.30 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.27 
No. of schools 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 
Baseline mean vol. 106.60 106.60 106.60 106.60 106.60 255.70 255.70 255.70 255.70 255.70 
Percentage reduction            
Treatment 1 -15.83% -15.47% -20.83% -24.95% -25.60% -4.83% -6.10% -8.83% -10.30% -10.54% 
Treatment 2 -10.26% -7.91% -9.56% -14.05% -15.13% -6.43% -6.09% -7.72% -10.27% -11.14% 
Fixed effects regressions. Suppressed coefficients on week, month, public holiday, school holiday, afterhours, weekend and night flow dummies. Robust standard errors clustered on school 
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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7. Limitations 
 
The study had a restricted timeline and sample size due to budget constraints and the high cost 
of a randomised control trial. The lengthy time required for meter installation and pre-
intervention maintenance restricted the number of schools that could participate in the study. 
Furthermore, water saving was of paramount concern during the Cape Town water crisis, thus 
the baseline period had to be curtailed in order to roll out treatment as soon as possible. The 
drought, the water restrictions, the high tariffs and the heightened awareness of the need to 
save water meant that our sample was not a blank page: most Cape Town residents were already 
engaging in water conservation. The already stringent restrictions may have made it difficult 
for staff and pupils to cut water usage still further in response to the behavioural treatments. 
The study also suffered from practical hindrances in the form of theft and vandalism of smart 
water meters – it must be remembered that this study, unlike many in the literature, was set in 
a developing country. Signal disruptions also affected data quality from the meters. A further 
limitation was that we had no control over the transfer of information from staff to pupils. 
Behavioural nudges were applied through text messages and emails to staff to ensure scalability 
at low cost. Applying the treatment in this group fashion limited our understanding of the effect 
on individual behaviour. 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
This study used a randomised control trial to investigate the effect of two behavioural 
interventions in the form of information feedback, one of them with the addition of an 
interschool social comparison, in improving water conservation in 105 schools across the 
Western Cape, South Africa. Overall reductions of between 15% and 26% were observed, 
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translating to significant water savings of 380 kilolitres per school per year on average. These 
savings were also highly cost effective with cost recuperated within ten months, even when 
excluding savings from the maintenance campaign. 
 
Separate analysis of treatment effects across times of day (school hours, after school hours and 
night time) revealed differences in the responses of staff and pupils. We observed greater 
reductions in water use during school hours, when pupils are the main users, when we provided 
not only feedback but also savings information from other schools for comparison. In contrast, 
we observed reductions in night time flow, which indicated better water management by staff, 
when we provided only feedback. The implication is that pupils were responsive to the social 
comparison, i.e. competition, whereas the staff reacted to it by shifting the responsibility of 
water saving to the pupils. When only water use feedback was provided, staff who received 
this information shouldered the water-saving burden themselves by improving leak detection 
and water management. This finding highlights the signalling effect that different forms of 
information can have in guiding behavioural change. Analysing the treatment effects month by 
month showed that water savings increased cumulatively over the four months of the 
intervention. This highlights the importance of repeated feedback to bring about behavioural 
change. A longer period of intervention would provide further insight. 
 
This study presents compelling insights into the effectiveness of information feedback and 
social comparison, along with the power of new technologies such as smart water meters, in 
promoting water saving in schools. Water conservation research to date has largely overlooked 
the fact that schools are major water users in a city. The example of Cape Town’s narrow 
escape from being a waterless city is a salutary reminder of the vital role water plays in 
sustainability.  
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Appendix 
 
 
Figure A1: Weekly usage information sent in e-mail feedback reports 
 
 
Figure A2: Hourly usage information sent in e-mail feedback reports 
 
Figure A3: Water volume heat map sent in e-mail feedback reports 
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Figure A4: Comparative information sent in e-mail social comparison reports 
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Figure A5: Poster sent to treatment 2 schools 
 
Figure A6: Poster sent to treatment 1 schools 
 35 
Table A1: Difference-in-differences regressions with dependent variable standardised to 
per pupil water use 
Dependent variable: Water usage volume litres/30min per pupil 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  All Night School After 
     
Post 0.024*** 0.022*** 0.029*** 0.027***  
(0.008) (0.007) (0.011) (0.008) 
Treatment 1 X Post -0.030** -0.034*** -0.029** -0.035***  
(0.013) (0.012) (0.015) (0.013) 
Treatment2 X Post -0.021*** -0.016** -0.031*** -0.021*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.007) 
Public holiday -0.042*** -0.002   
 (0.003) (0.002)   
School holiday -0.046*** -0.009***   
 (0.003) (0.003)   
After-hours indicator -0.109***    
 (0.005)    
Weekend -0.049*** -0.0002   
 (0.002) (0.001)   
Major leak  0.855*** 1.540*** 0.619*** 1.303*** 
 (0.069) (0.262) (0.037) (0.123) 
Night flow 0.061*** 0.101*** 0.044*** 0.065*** 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) 
     
Constant 0.202*** 0.0348*** 0.307*** 0.0788*** 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012) 
     
Hours All hours Night hours School hours After hours 
 00:00-24:00 01:00-04:00 07:00-14:00 14:00-07:00 
Weekends & holidays Yes Yes No No 
Observations 679 649 99 120 124 964 274 935 
R-squared 0.366 0.400 0.236 0.281 
No. of schools 105 105 105 105 
Baseline mean vol. 0.101 0.051 0.246 0.067 
Percentage reduction:     
Treatment 1 -29,80% -67,72% -11,79% -52,62% 
Treatment 2 -20,69% -32,08% -12,64% -31,63% 
Fixed effects regressions. Robust standard errors clustered on school in parentheses. Suppressed coefficients on month, 
week. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A2: DiD output with sample split by schools with usage above and below the baseline mean usage 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  All All Night Night School  School After After 
Above or Below Baseline Mean Below Above Below Above Below Above Below Above 
         
Post 16.20** 10.60 10.73*** 22.29 25.46** 12.79 16.83*** 22.64  
(6.91) (21.76) (3.73) (24.30) (9.94) (18.10) (5.39) (29.98) 
Treatment1 X Post  -8.13 -39.48 -9.99* -70.77** -5.83 -48.10* -8.12 -74.15*  
(7.56) (28.31) (5.13) (32.27) (12.32) (24.83) (6.84) (37.35) 
Treatment2 X Post -15.73** -4.78 -8.95* -17.93 -25.39** -25.46 -15.74*** -15.20 
 (6.27) (19.91) (4.54) (24.27) (11.30) (15.69) (5.44) (27.88) 
         
Constant 146.00*** 289.10*** 10.99 33.38 213.20*** 456.80*** 50.65*** 109.80*** 
 (9.46) (27.65) (8.06) (21.95) (14.59) (30.19) (7.97) (24.41) 
         
Hours All All  Night Night School School After After 
 00:00-24:00 00:00-24:00 01:00-04:00 01:00-04:00 07:00-14:00 07:00-14:00 14:00-07:00 14:00-07:00 
Weekends and holidays         
Observations 418 271 261 378 64 463 34,66 73 371 51 593 183 383 91 552 
R-squared 0.39 0.41 0.38 0.44 0.23 0.30 0.29 0.28 
Number of schools 67 38 72 33 64 41 72 33 
Baseline mean vol, 55.41 199.80 15.33 134.80 156.10 420.50 30.46 160.50 
Fixed effects regressions. Robust standard errors clustered on school in parentheses. Suppressed coefficients on month, week, major leak, night flow,after-hours, weekends, public 
holidays and school holidays. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A3: DiD output with high consuming schools systematically dropped 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (10) (11) (12) 
Outliers dropped   med>=200 med>=150   med>=200 med>=150   med>=200 med>=150 
Hours All hours All hours All hours School hours School hours School hours Night hours Night hours Night hours 
  00:00-24:00 00:00-24:00 00:00-24:00 07:00-14:00 07:00-14:00 07:00-14:00 01:00-04:00 01:00-04:00 01:00-04:00 
Weekends & holidays Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Dependent variable: Water usage (litres/30min) 
Treatment 1 X Post -27.29** -25.63** -11.66* -26.96* -21.85 -12.70 -31.23** -29.71*** -14.29** 
  (13.02) (11.89) (6.49) (13.84) (13.83) (12.13) (12.93) (11.30) (5.59) 
Treatment2 X Post -16.13** -19.95*** -22.32*** -28.48*** -28.72*** -29.40*** -11.73 -14.26** -16.12*** 
  (7.52) (6.336) (6.42) (9.29) (9.90) (10.09) (8.34) (5.76) (5.50) 
    
 
      
 
   
Observations 679 649 621 560 581 448 124 964 114 682 107 482 99 12 90 643 84 791 
R-squared 0.38 0.40 0.40 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.40 0.43 0.47 
No. of schools 105 97 92 105 97 92 105 97 92 
Baseline mean vol. 106.60 91.97 83.29 255.70 238.80 227.60 53.48 38.85 31.28 
% change T1 -25.60% -27.87% -14.00% -10,54% -9,15% -5,58% -58.40% -76.47% -45.68% 
% change T2 -15.13% -21.69% -26.80% -11,14% -12,03% -12,92% -21.93% -36.71% -51.53% 
Dependent variable: Water usage per pupil (litres/30min) 
Treatment 1 X Post -0.030** -0.028** -0.015* -0.029** -0.016 -0.025* -0.034*** -0.0313*** -0.018*** 
  (0.013) (0.012) (0.008) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.012) (0.011) (0.006) 
Treatment2 X Post -0.021*** -0.024*** -0.026*** -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.016** -0.017*** -0.020*** 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
    
  
          
Observations 679 649 621 560 581 448 124 964 107 482 114 682 99 12 90 643 84 791 
R-squared 0.366 0.377 0.389 0.236 0.244 0.238 0.400 0.442 0.474 
No. of schools 105 97 92 105 92 97 105 97 92 
Baseline mean vol. 0.101 0.090 0.0819 0.246 0.225 0.234 0.051 0.038 0.032 
% change T1 -29.80% -31.17% -18.44% -11,79% -7,11% -10,56% -67.72% -81.72% -56.78% 
% change T2 -20.69% -26.26% -31.87% -12,64% -13,91% -13,25% -32.08% -44.91% -63.41% 
med: Median water use L/30min over entire period of study. Fixed effects regressions. Robust standard errors clustered on school in parentheses. Suppressed coefficients on month, week, afterhours, weekends, major 
leaks, night flow public holidays and school holidays. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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